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Evidence 
by Joseph B. Harvey* 
On January 1, 1967, the California Evidence Code began 
to govern trials held in California courtS.1 Because of the 
delays necessarily incident to litigation, the appellate courts 
were not called upon to review trials held under the new 
rules in significant numbers until 1968. With the 1968 deci-
sions, however, the impact of the Code upon California prac-
tice has become fairly apparent. At the same time, the 
courts have continued to develop rules of evidence designed 
to implement the various procedural guarantees found in 
the Constitution of the United States, and some of these court-
developed rules have had significant effect, particularly in 
criminal cases. 
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Meanwhile, the legislature was content to make few, and 
only minor, changes in the statutory law of evidence. Thus 
the principal arena for securing changes in evidence law 
has shifted from the legislature to the courts. 
Legislative Developments of 1968 
The 1968 session of the California Legislature added four 
sections to the Evidence Code, none of major significance. 
Chapter 1375 of the statutes of 1968 authorized the for-
mation of professional service corporations by lawyers and 
physicians to perform legal and medical services.2 As part 
of this legislation, sections 954 and 994 of the Evidence Code 
were amended to provide that the attorney-client relationship 
and the physician-patient relationship exists between the law 
corporation and its client and the medical corporation and 
its patient for the purposes of the respective communication 
privileges. 
By Chapter 1122 of the statutes of 1968, the legislature 
also added sections 1157 and 1158 to the Evidence Code. 
Section 1157 provides that the proceedings and records of 
neither a hospital medical staff committee having the responsi-
bility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care 
rendered in the hospital nor a medical review committee of 
a local medical society are subject to discovery. No person 
in attendance at a meeting of such a committee may be re-
quired to testify concerning its proceedings. However, the 
privilege created by the section does not apply to statements 
made at such a meeting by a party to an action the subject 
matter of which was reviewed at the meeting. Nor does it 
apply to a meeting if a person serves on a committee reviewing 
his own conduct. The privilege is inapplicable, also, in any 
action against an insurance carrier for bad faith in refusing 
to settle a case within policy limits. 
Section 1158 requires licensed medical personnel and li-
censed hospitals to make available to an attorney for a patient 
all of the patient's medical records for inspection and copying 
2. See Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2500-
2508,6160-6172. 
2 CAL LAW 1969 
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upon the patient's written authorization. The section may 
be invoked though no action has been filed. Thus, an attor-
ney who wants to inspect his client's medical records to see 
if there is a basis for a malpractice claim may force disclosure 
of such records without filing an action and using the formal 
discovery procedures provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Judicial Developments of 1968 
As in prior years the courts have continued to develop rules 
of evidence from the procedural guarantees of the United 
States Constitution. The bulk of the appellate cases dealing 
with evidence are, therefore, criminal cases. There have 
been a few significant noncriminal cases-e.g., those cases 
dealing with the parol evidence rule-but almost all of the 
significant decisions dealing with evidence have dealt with 
criminal matters. 
Identification Evidence 
The most significant series of cases decided in 1968 were 
those dealing with pretrial identification of criminal defend-
ants by their victims and other witnesses. In 1967 the United 
States Supreme Court decided that a defendant is entitled to 
counsel at a police lineup.3 In People v. Feggans4 the state 
supreme court decided that, as a matter of state law, this 
rule would be applicable only to police lineups occurring after 
June 12, 1967.4.1 As to lineups occurring before such time, 
3. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 
(1967); Gilbert v. California. 388 U.S. 
263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1951 
(1967). 
4. 67 Cal.2d 444, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419, 
432 P.2d 21 (1967). 
4.1. The date thus established is an-
other in a series of dates fixed by the 
United States and California Supreme 
Courts for determining the applicability 
of various constitutional rules of evi-
dence. June 19, 1961-the federal rule 
prohibiting admission in state court 
trials of evidence obtained by an illegal 
search and seizure will be applied only 
to cases not final on the date of the deci-
sion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 
A.L.R.2d 933 (1961). Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 
85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965). June 22,1964-
the federal rule prohibiting admission 
of a statement elicited in violation of 
the defendant's right to counsel is ap-
plicable to trials beginning after the 
date of decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 
1758 (1964); Johnson v. New Jersey, 
384 U.S. 719, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct. 
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a defendant is entitled to attack the procedure if it unfairly 
directed the attention of the identifying witness to the partic-
ular defendant. 5 
The consequences of failure to comply with these constitu-
tional requirements have been spelled out in a number of 
cases. In People v. Caruso,51 the defendant was placed with 
four men who did not resemble him at all. The defendant 
was six feet one inch tall and weighed 238 pounds. He was 
1772 (1966). In California, the rule is 
applicable to c{{ses I/ot final on the 
stated date. People v. Rollins, 65 Cal. 
2d 681, 56 Cal. Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221 
(1967). April 28, 1965-the federal 
rule prohibiting comment upon a de-
fendant's failure to testify will be ap-
plied only to cases not {illal on the date 
of decision in Griffin v. California. 380 
U.S. 609, 14 l.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.C!. 
1229 (1965). Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 
406, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 S.C!. 459 
(1966). lillie 13, 1966-the federal rule 
prohibiting the admission of statements 
elicited during custodial interrogation 
without the warning prescribed in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 16 
L.Ed.2d 694,86 S.C!. 1602, 10 A.L.R. 
3d 974 (1966) is applicable only in tri{{ls 
cOlI/lI/cncillg after the date of the 
Miranda decision. Johnson v. New 
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. 
86 S.C!. 1772 (1966); People v. Rollins, 
65 Cal.2d 681, 56 Cal. Rptr. 293, 423 
P.2d 221 (1967). lillie 12, 1967-the 
federal rule requiring representation by 
counsel at lineups is applicable only to 
lilleups occllrring after the date of deci-
sion in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.C!. 1926 
(1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 
U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d lIn, 87 S.C!. 
1951 (1967). Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.C!. 
I 967 (1967). 
The trend of these decisions is toward 
a recognition that the court is making 
law (as does a legislature), not dis-
covering it. Hence, the courts are be-
4 CAL LAW 1969 
ginning to establish "effective dates" for 
their legislative pronouncements even as 
legislatures do. The judicial process is 
such, however, that a discrimination 
frequently results when "legislation" is 
created by a case decision: e.g., a rule 
was applied to the lineups in Wade and 
Gilbert that was different from the rule 
applied to all other lineups occurring 
prior to June 12, 1967. Moreover, law 
enforcement officials frequently find the 
evidence they have obtained is inadmis-
sible because of the violation of rules 
they could not know would be appli-
cable. 
These problems might be avoided if 
the Court would candidly admit that the 
federal Constitution does not prescribe 
these new evidentia:'y rules-these rules 
have been devised by the court as a 
means of enforcing the Constitution. 
The rules adopted by the court for en-
forcing the Constitution might then be 
set forth in promulgated court rules 
with a prescribed effective date. Then 
all litigants would be treated equally. 
Enforcement officials would not be sub-
ject to retroactive rules. Moreover, the 
court rule procedure would provide a 
needed flexibility should it develop that 
any of these new constitutional rules of 
evidence are not workable. 
5. People v. Caruso, 68 Ca1.2d 183, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336 (1968). 
5.1. 68 Cal.2d 183,65 Cal. Rptr. 336, 
436 P.2d 336 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Collings, CRIM-
INAL LAW, in this volume. 
4
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of Italian descent with a very dark complexion and dark wavy 
hair. The other lineup participants were not his size, did not 
have dark complexions, and did not have dark wavy hair. 
Accordingly, the supreme court determined that the lineup 
and identification procedure was grossly unfair to the defend-
ant. The evidence of the lineup was, therefore, inadmissible. 
Moreover, the court held that the identifying witness should 
not be permitted to identify the defendant in court unless 
the people can show on voir dire by clear and convincing 
proof that the in-court identification testimony is not tainted 
by the unfair pretrial lineup. The people must show that the 
in-court identification testimony is based on the original recol-
lection of the appearance of the defendant and not upon a 
recollection based on the unfair lineup.6 
In People v. Menchaca7 the victim was face to face with 
the actual criminal for but a few seconds. The criminal was 
of Mexican extraction. In the lineup, the defendant was the 
only Mexican participating. The court found the lineup to 
be unfair, and found no evidence in the record to show that 
the in-court identification of the defendant was free from 
the taint of the unfair lineup. The conviction was reversed. 
In People v. HoganS the defendant was the only Negro in 
the lineup. This, too, was found to be so unfair as to amount 
to a deprivation of due process of law, and the defendant's 
conviction was reversed. The trial court was instructed to 
exclude any evidence of an in-court identification unless the 
people could establish by clear and convincing proof that 
the in-court identification was based solely upon the witness's 
observations of the accused at the scene of the crime and 
not upon the pretrial identification. 
In People v. Irvin 9 the identification witness was confronted 
at the police station with only the accused persons. There 
was no lineup and no exhibition of any person other than 
6. See 68 Ca1.2d at 189-191,65 Cal. 8. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. at 341, 436 P.2d at 341. Rptr. 448 (1968). For further discus-
7. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. sian of this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL 
843 (1968). For further discussion of LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this volume. 
this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW 9. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
AND PROCEDURE, in this volume. 892 (\968). 
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the suspect. Although the court criticized the practice of 
permitting identification by confrontation with only the ac-
cused, it nevertheless held that such a confrontation may be 
justifiable under exceptional circumstances. The court pointed 
out the need for a prompt identification where apprehension 
of the suspect immediately follows the crime. Such a prompt 
confrontation aids in quickly exonerating the innocent and 
discovering the guilty.lO Prompt confrontation may also pro-
mote accuracy of identification. The court in Irvin also found 
that the in-court identification testimony itself showed that 
the prior confrontation had no "priming" effect on the witness. 
In People v. Padgittll the defendant was identified by one 
victim of his crimes from mug shots. He asserted on appeal 
that he had the right to have counsel present at the identifica-
tion. The court of appeal disagreed, holding in accord with 
Simmons v. United States12 that convictions based on eye-
witness identification at trial following a pretrial identification 
by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the 
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification. Finding no unfairness in the 
particular instance, the defendant's conviction was affirmed. 
In People v. Shannon13 pictures of the defendant were illegally 
taken from his apartment and shown to the victim. The 
victim's in-court identification was admitted despite the iden-
tification of the defendant from the illegally taken photo-
graphs. The court was able to conclude that the in-court 
identification of the defendant was independent of the iden-
10. In People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 
2d 448, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658 
(1963), the court suggested such a single 
confrontation as an investigatory tech-
nique for determining whether there 
was probable cause for arresting a sus-
pect. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.C!. 1967 
(1967) there is an implication that a 
one-on-one identification without the 
presence of counsel is prohibited by the 
rule announced in Gilbert v. California, 
6 CAL LAW 1969 
388 U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.C!. 
1951 (1967); for the identification in 
Stovall was a one-on-one identification 
and was saved by the court's refusal to 
apply Gilbert to identifications occur-
ring before June 12, 1967. 
11. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
345 (1968). 
12. 390 U.S. 377, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 
88 S.C!. 967 (1968). 
13. 256 Cal. App.2d 889, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 491 (1967). 
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tification made from the photographs shown to the victim, 
because she had been in earnest conversation with the defend-
ant for at least one-half hour at a distance of twelve to four-
teen inches, and had great familiarity with his face. 
In People v. Douglas14 there was a conflict in the testimony 
concerning the circumstances of the lineup. The court pointed 
out that, under Evidence Code section 405, the judge is 
required to resolve any evidentiary conflict in determining 
whether the lineup was unfair. If he determines that the 
lineup was unfair, he may still admit the in-court identification 
if he determines that the in-court testimony had an independ-
ent origin and was not tainted by the unfair pretrial lineup. 
If the judge permits the in-court identification, the defendant 
may nevertheless offer before the jury such evidence of unfair-
ness as he can produce. This, however, goes to weight rather 
than admissibility.14.1 
Admissions and Confessions 
During 1968 many of the appellate cases dealing with 
evidence were concerned with establishing the limits of the 
Dorado-Escobedo-Miranda interrogation rules. I5 
In Miranda v. ArizonaI6 the Supreme Court held that, not 
only must a suspect in custody be warned of his constitutional 
right to remain silent, but all police questioning must cease 
when it appears that the suspect wishes to assert that right and 
remain silent. In People v. Fioritto,17 the defendant was 
warned and refused to waive his right to remain silent. The 
14. 259 Cal. App.2d 694. 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1968). 
14.1. See Cal. Evid. Code § 406. 
15. See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 
436. 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 
A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); Escobedo v. Illi-
nois. 378 U.S. 478. 12 L.Ed.2d 977. 84 
S.Ct. 1758 (1964); People v. Dorado. 
62 Cal.2d 338. 42 Cal. Rptr. 169. 398 
P.2d 361 (1965). cert. den. 381 U.S. 937. 
14 L.Ed.2d 702. 85 S.Ct. 1765. The 
Dorado-Escobedo rules are applicable 
to those cases where the appeal was not 
final before June 22. 1964. The addi-
tional criteria established by Miranda 
are to be applied to trials beginning 
after June 13. 1966. People v. Rollins. 
65 Cal.2d 681. 56 Cal. Rptr. 293. 423 
P.2d 221 (1967). 
16. 384 U.S. 436. 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 
86 S.C!. 1602. 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). 
17. 68 Cal.2d 714.68 Cal. Rptr. 817. 
441 P .2d 625 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case. see Collings. CRIM-
INAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. in this 
volume. 
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police then confronted the defendant with his accomplices, 
who had confessed and implicated the defendant. After a 
heated argument between the defendant and his accomplices, 
the accomplices were taken away and the defendant was again 
asked if he would waive his right to remain silent. The 
defendant then signed a waiver and confessed. The court 
held that his interrogation should have ceased upon his first 
refusal to waive his right to remain silent. The confession 
was obtained, therefore, in violation of the Miranda standard 
and was inadmissible. 
In People v. MatthewsI8 the defendant solicited an interview 
with the police "to clear things up." Previously, he had been 
given several warnings as to his constitutional rights. None 
of the warnings, however, was wholly adequate under Miranda 
to inform the defendant of his right to the presence of his 
counsel at the interview. The interview was conducted in 
question and answer form and it elicited several highly 
incriminating statements. The people sought to avoid exclu-
sion of the defendant's statements on the ground that they 
were volunteered and, hence, Miranda was inapplicable. The 
court held that the interrogating officer, in a volunteered inter-
view, must remain neutral. Otherwise, the officer may "elicit 
more incriminating matter than the suspect would have vol-
unteered." Where the police role in the interview is not 
passive, where the police lead the direction of the interview 
through their questioning, they must give the M il'anda warning 
despite the fact that the defendant's participation in the inter-
view is volunteered. If the warning is not given, the informa-
tion elicited is inadmissible despite the defendant's voluntary 
participation in the interview. 
Matthews also held that it is essential to warn the suspect 
of his Miranda rights at the outset of each interrogation. 19 
This statement is in conflict with at least two other appellate 
cases. In both People v. Long20 and in People v. Sievers/ 
18. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 20. 263 Cal. App.2d 540, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 756 (1968). Rptr. 698 (1968). 
19. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. 1. 255 Cal. App.2d 34, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 765. 841 (1967). 
8 CAL LAW 1969 
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it was held that one warning is sufficient. It is not necessary 
to give an additional warning at each interview. The 
Matthews court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement in 
Miranda that "whatever the background of the person inter-
rogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispen-
sable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual 
knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.,,2 
Moreover, Miranda holds that there must be an affirmative 
waiver of the suspect's constitutional rights before the ques-
tioning can proceed.3 
The Miranda standards were not applicable to the Sievers 
triaV They were, however, applicable to the trial in People 
v. Long. s Nevertheless, the court in Long followed Sievers 
in ruling that one warning is sufficient. 6 The Matthews read-
ing of Miranda appears, however, to be correct.7 Accord-
ingly, police officers and prosecuting officials should be reluc-
tant to place too much weight on the Sievers and Long opin-
ions. Admissibility will be assured only if a warning is given 
each time governmental representatives undertake to obtain 
information from a suspect in custody through an interroga-
tion process. Under Matthews, such a warning should be 
given whenever questioning is carried on even though the 
suspect solicited the interview. 
The courts have also been concerned with the definition of a 
custodial interrogation. A conversation in a police station 
is not necessarily a custodial interrogation if the defendant 
is under the impression that he can leave at any time.s The 
2. 384 U.s. at 469, 16 L.Ed.2d at 
720, 86 S.Ct. at -, 10 A.L.R.3d at 
1008. 
3. "[AJ valid waiver will not be pre-
sumed simply from the silence of the 
accused after warnings are given or 
simply from the fact that a confession 
was in fact eventually obtained . . . . 
'Presuming waiver from a silent record 
is impermissible. The record must 
show, or there must be an allegation 
and evidence which show, that an ac-
cused was offered counsel but intelli-
gently and understandingly rejected the 
offer. Anything less is not waiver.''' 
384 U.S. at 475, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724, 86 
S.Ct. at -, 10 A.L.R.3d at 1012. 
4. See 255 Cal. App.2d at 37, 62 
Cal. Rptr. at 843. 
5. 263 Cal. App.2d at 544-545, 69 
Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
6. 263 Cal. App.2d at 545, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 701. 
7. See footnote 2, supra and accom-
panying text. 
8. People v. Gioviannini, 260 Cal. 
App.2d 597, 67 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1968). 
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emphasis is not on the interrogator's subjective intent, but 
on whether the defendant reasonably believes his freedom of 
movement is restricted by pressures of physical authority. 
Where the defendant is in custody on a charge other than that 
under investigation, an interrogation conducted by the usual 
question and answer method is a custodial interrogation and 
the Miranda warning must be given if the information elic-
ited is to be used against the defendant.9 However, even 
though a person is in custody, a custodial officer can ask him 
a neutral question such as "what happened?" upon arriving at 
the scene of some incident in the prison where the question 
is asked as part of the general investigation to determine 
whether a crime has been committed.1o If the conduct of 
the individual being questioned is itself the subject matter 
of the inquiry, however, it seems likely that any answers will 
be inadmissible unless the Miranda warning was given. ll 
In People v. Hernandez12 the court concluded that the 
routine questions asked by a booking officer at the jail do 
not amount to the kind of custodial interrogation against 
which the Miranda rule is intended as a guard. Thus, in 
Hernandez the booking officer at the jail was permitted to 
testify to the birthdate given by the defendant at the time of 
his booking even though the Miranda warning requirement 
was not met before the booking questions were asked. The 
defendant's birthdate was important in the case to identify 
him as the same person referred to in a birth certificate. The 
birth certificate, in turn, was relevant to show the defendant 
to be over 21, an essential element of the crime charged-
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11532 (sale of 
marijuana to a minor). 
Miranda does not apply to statements made by a defendant 
in custody to a probation officer engaged in preparing the 
defendant's pre-sentence reporL 13 Miranda does not require 
9. People v. Woodberry, 265 Cal. 11. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 
App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1968); J, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968). 
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 12. 263 Cal. App.2d 242, 69 Cal. 
20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968). Rptr. 448 (1968). 
10. People v. Mercer, 257 Cal. App. 13. People v. Smith, 259 Cal. App.2d 
2d 244, 64 Cal. Rptr. 86 J (1968). 8 J 4, 66 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1968). 
10 CAL LAW 1969 
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a warning before a suspect is asked to perform an act such 
as the giving of a handwriting exemplar.14 A suspect not in 
custody need not be given a Miranda warning before he talks 
to a person who, unknown to the suspect, is acting as a police 
agent.15 Similarly, a person who is unknowingly in the pres-
ence of police officers need not be given a Miranda warning 
before he is permitted to perform a criminal act. 16 
A reading of the many cases dealing with confessions and 
a defendant's rights under custodial interrogation leads one 
to believe that the enactment of the Evidence Code may have 
solved some of the procedural problems that could have been 
presented to the appellate courts under the former law. In 
People v. MidkifJI7 it is pointed out that the judge alone 
must decide whether the Miranda-Dorado warning require-
ments were met. The enactment of section 405 of the Evi-
dence Code has forestalled any contention that compliance 
with the Miranda warning requirements must be decided by 
the jury as well as the judge. As the warning cases shade 
imperceptibly into the coerced confession cases, it would have 
been extremely difficult to determine which confession cases 
should be decided by the judge alone and which confession 
cases would be submitted to the jury. By providing a uni-
form admissibility procedure, the Code has permitted the 
courts to confine the jury in all cases to its basic responsibility 
of determining guilt or innocence, withholding from it the 
additional responsibility of determining the admissibilty of 
evidence. 
Co-conspirators' Confessions 
In People v. SpriggsI8 the California Supreme Court created 
a new exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against 
penal interest-Le., statements that are so self-incriminating 
14. People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418, 17. 262 Cal App.2d 734, 68 Cal. 
67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321 (1968). Rptr. 866 (1968). 
15. People v. Ragen, 262 Cal. App.2d 18. 60 Cal.2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 
392, 68 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1968). 389 P.2d 377 (1964). 
16. People v. Marinos, 260 Cal. App. 
2d 735, 67 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1968). 
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that it is unlikely the speaker would have made them if they 
were not true. In that case, the declaration against penal 
interest was offered by the defendant. The rule of People v. 
Spriggs was codified in section 1230 of the Evidence Code, 
subject to the qualification that the declarant be shown to 
be unavailable as a witness. 
In People v. Aranda19 the court held that the confession 
of one codefendant identifying a codefendant as another par-
ticipant in the crime cannot be admitted in the trial of the 
identified codefendant unless the identification can be success-
fully deleted from the confession. If the identifying informa-
tion cannot be successfully deleted, the trials of the codefend-
ants must be severed. In Bruton v. United StateiO the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the Aranda rule as a require-
ment of federal due process. Aranda and Bruton both con-
sidered an instruction to the jury-permitting use of the con-
fession against the confessor only-an inadequate protection 
for the codefendant. Roberts v. RusselF made the rule in 
Bruton retroactive. 
Unfortunately, there has been little discussion of the rela-
tionship between the Aranda-Bruton rule and the hearsay 
exception for declarations against penal interest. One may 
hypothesize that the rationale underlying Aranda is that, since 
the portion of a confession that implicates another is not in-
criminatory as to the declarant, it is not against his penal 
interest. Therefore, the portion of a confession implicating 
another is not sufficiently against the penal interest of the 
declarant to meet the demands of the exception to the hearsay 
rule. If this analysis is correct, the portion of the confession 
that implicates the declarant himself should be admissible 
to prove the declarant's own participation in the crime when-
ever relevant in the trial of another. This could be relevant 
to the guilt of another in a number of contexts. For example, 
if the declarant and defendant were co-conspirators, the 
19. 63 Cal.2d 518,47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 1. 392 U.S. 293, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100, 
407 P.2d 265 (1965). 88 S.C!. 1921 (1968). 
20. 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 
88 S.C!. 1620 (1968). 
12 CAL LAW 1969 
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confessor's statement might be used to prove what the con-
fessor had done in the course of the conspiracy. In a prose-
cution for receiving stolen goods, the thief's confession that 
he stole the goods might be used to prove that the goods were 
stolen by the thief and not by some third person. 
This rationale and analysis has yet to be tested in the courts. 
In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court suggested that 
one reason for the rule requiring separate trials is that, where 
the confessor does not take the stand, his confession cannot 
be tested by cross-examination. This, perhaps, violates the 
defendant's right of confrontation. 2 This rationale would 
prevent the introduction in a defendant's separate trial of a 
declaration against penal interest made by a co-conspirator, 
for the co-conspirator's privilege against self-incrimination 
would preclude effective cross-examination. But, this ration-
ale, too, would exclude a considerable amount of hearsay tradi-
tionally thought to be admissible against criminal defendants. 
For example, in People v. Moralei it was held that the Aranda 
rule does not require separate trials when the statement of 
the declarant is admissible under Evidence Code section 1223 
as a statement of a co-conspirator made in the course and in 
furtherance of a conspiracy. Where the declarant does not 
take the stand, however, his statement, even though made to 
further a conspiracy and admissible under the traditional 
hearsay exception, cannot be tested by cross-examination. The 
Bruton rationale, thus, would strike at the admissibility of 
this statement. It would also strike at the admissibility of 
dying declarations,4 for it is inherent in the nature of the 
exception that the declarant is unavailable for cross-exami-
nation. Statements under these latter exceptions can be far 
more devastating to a defendant than a declaration against 
penal interest implicating only the declarant, for statements 
of a co-conspirator and dying declarations are admissible 
though they specifically identify the defendant. 
The real problem here is how far the legislature and the 
2. 391 U.s. at 136. See 20 L.Ed.2d 3. 263 Cal. App.2d 368, 69 Cal. 
at 485, 88 S.Ct. at -. Rptr. 402 (1968). 
4. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1242. 
CAL LAW 1969 13 
13
Harvey: Evidence
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Evidence 
courts can go in creating exceptions to the hearsay rule. s 
The question is whether the hearsay rule was frozen upon 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791 or whether it can 
be permitted to develop. Heretofore, it has always been 
supposed that the right of confrontation has not precluded 
the development of new hearsay exceptions.6 The recent 
emphasis of the Supreme Courts of this state and of the 
United States upon the right of confrontation in hearsay con-
texts may foreshadow some rolling back of the hearsay rule 
insofar as the exceptions to it may be invoked against the 
defendant in a criminal case. 
Perhaps, because of the right of confrontation, section 1230 
of the Evidence Code states an exception that may be invoked 
by a defendant in a criminal case but not by the people. 
There is language in Bruton that suggests that this may be 
the case. Nevertheless, there is no holding to that effect at 
the present time, and so far as this author knows the question 
has not as yet been presented to the California appellate courts. 
Until the question is decided, therefore, it is at least still argu-
able that Aranda and section 1230 are reconcilable and that 
the portion of a confession that implicates only the declarant 
himself is admissible as a declaration against penal interest 
when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 
Cases dealing with the Aranda rule during 1968 have held 
that it does not apply to statements of a co-conspirator, made 
in the course of the conspiracy, that are admissible under 
section 1223 of the Evidence Code.7 The Aranda rule does 
not require a separate trial when the evidence taken from 
the codefendant is physical evidence, and not a statement or 
confession.s Noncompliance with the Aranda rule does not 
5. This problem also arises in other 
contexts which will be discussed infra. 
6. "The exceptions are not . . . 
static, but may be enlarged from time 
to time if there is no material departure 
from the reason for the general rule." 
Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97 at 107, 78 L.Ed. 674 at 
14 CAL LAW 1969 
679, 54 S.Ct. 330 at -, 90 A.L.R. 575 
at 580, overruled on other grounds 378 
U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489 
(1934). 
7. People v. Morales, 263 Cal. App. 
2d 368, 69 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1968). 
8. People v. King, 255 Cal. App.2d 
551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1967). 
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require a reversal when the defendant himself has made an 
admissible confession which completely shatters his own case.9 
Prior Statements of Witnesses; Former Testimony 
The Evidence Code has four sections-1235, 1236, 1237 
and 1238-dealing with statements made by trial witnesses 
prior to the commencement of the trial. Sections 1290-1292 
of the Code deal with testimony given at previous trials by 
witnesses who are not available to testify at the current trial. 
The cases dealing with these sections during 1968 have con-
sidered the problems somewhat interrelated, and they will 
be considered together here. 
Under the Code, a prior inconsistent statement of a witness 
is admissible though he has not given damaging testimony 
against the party introducing the inconsistent statement.10 In 
People v. lohnsonll the supreme court considered the appli-
cation of this exception to a criminal defendant. The court 
found that it violates the criminal defendant's right to confront 
the witnesses against him, and is thus unconstitutional if so 
applied. The court developed its ruling from cases where 
there had been an attempt to introduce a pretrial statement 
of a person who was not available for cross-examination at 
the trial. But the court reasoned that a right of cross-examina-
tion, to be meaningful, must be a right to cross-examine at 
the time of the statements that are being offered as substan-
tive evidence. 
The court criticized the rationale of the Law Revision Com-
mission in recommending section 1235, which stated "the 
dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect 
are largely nonexistent. The declarant is in court and may 
be examined and cross-examined in regard to his statements 
and their subject matter. ,,12 But in giving this justification 
for the rule, the Law Revision Commission was echoing the 
9. People v. Bosby, 256 Cal. App.2d 11. 68 Ca1.2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 
209, 64 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1967). 441 P.2d 111 (1968). 
10. See People v. Woodberry, 265 12. Comment to Cal. Evid. Code 
Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 165 § 1235. 
(1968). 
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supreme court itself. In People v. Gould13 the court had 
held that a pretrial identification, although hearsay, can be 
admitted against a criminal defendant because "the principal 
danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since 
the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination."14 
This rationale when used by the Law Revision Commission 
obviously did not appeal to the court as much as it did when 
conceived by the court itself. Yet, there seems little to dis-
tinguish the lohnson case substantively from the Gould case. 
Gould involved a pretrial identification of two suspects by 
a witness. At the trial, the witness did not testify that she 
had previously identified the criminals. She said that she 
was shown pictures and selected two that "looked similar 
to the men who were in my apartment but not all the features 
were the same."15 Her testimony at the trial was the same 
insofar as one defendant was concerned, and in regard to the 
other defendant the witness did not identify him at the trial. 
The prosecution then introduced a police officer to testify 
that the witness had made a positive identification of the 
defendants from photographs. This, obviously, was incon-
sistent with her testimony that she had not made such a posi-
tive identification. In Gould, the court held the police offi-
cer's testimony admissible and justified its holding on the 
ground that the identifying witness was present in court for 
cross-examination. Yet, if the rationale of lohnson had been 
applied, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the identify-
ing witness at the time of the identification should have resulted 
in an exclusion of the identification testimony under the hear-
say rule. 
Evidence Code section 1238 provides a hearsay exception 
for prior identification testimony, but only where the identify-
ing witness testifies positively that he made a true identifica-
tion on the prior occasion. The Gould case would not have 
been saved by section 1238 of the Code, for in Gould the 
13. 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, IS. 54 Cal.2d at 625, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 
354 P.2d 865 (1960). 274-275, 354 P.2d at 866-867. 
14. 54 Cal.2d at 626, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 
275, 354 P.2d at 867. 
16 CAL LAW 1969 
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identifying witness did not testify positively that the prior 
identification was a correct identification. Insofar as Gould 
states a broader rule than section 1238 of the Code, therefore, 
it may be that People v. Johnson has overruled the Gould 
decision. Whether it has or not will have to await further 
decisions. 
The scope of the new rule in Johnson is not altogether clear. 
Apparently, the defendant can still use the prior inconsistent 
statement of a witness as substantive evidence, because the 
prosecution has no constitutional right of confrontation.16 
Apparently, where a witness gives damaging testimony against 
the prosecution, the prosecution can use a prior inconsistent 
statement to impeach the witness though the prosecution is 
not surprised by the testimony. I? Although the courts in 
other contexts have been critical of the efficacy of limiting 
instructions,18 it is likely that a court must give an instruction 
on a prior inconsistent statement limiting its consideration 
to impeachment only.19 
Where the inconsistent statement was given in testimony 
at the preliminary hearing, application of Johnson has resulted 
in a rather anomalous rule. Section 1291 of the Evidence 
Code provides that testimony given in a previous hearing 
or trial, where the defendant had an opportunity to fully 
cross-examine the witness, is admissible against the defendant 
at a subsequent trial if the witness is unavailable to testify 
at that time. Under this exception, the testimony of a witness 
at a preliminary hearing can be admitted at the trial if the 
witness is no longer available20 and the defendant, by counsel, 
had a full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary 
hearing. 1 
16. See the suggestion in People v. 
Stanley, 67 Cal.2d 812, 816, footnote 1, 
63 Cal. Rptr. 825. 827, 433 P.2d 913, 
915 (1968). 
17. People v. Woodberry, 265 Cal. 
App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1968). 
18. See Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620 
(1968). 
19. The law as stated in People v 
2 
Orcalles, 32 Cal.2d 562, 197 P.2d 26 
(1948) probably remains unchanged in 
the light of Johnson. People v. Odom, 
265 A.C.A. 387,71 Cal. Rptr. 260 held 
that such an instruction must be given, 
but the Supreme Court vacated the 
opinion by granting a hearing. 
20. See Cal. Evid. Code § 240. 
1. People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal. 
App.2d 242, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968). 
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The United States Supreme Court has recently added the 
further limitation that if a preliminary hearing witness is in-
carcerated outside the state, the prosecution must show a 
diligent effort to obtain his presence at the trial in order 
that the defendant might confront and cross-examine the wit-
ness at the tria1. 2 Thus, where the preliminary hearing wit-
ness is entirely absent and there is no opportunity to question 
him at the trial on the merits, his preliminary hearing testi-
mony can be introduced as substantive evidence under section 
1291. However, if the witness appears and testifies in a man-
ner inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, the 
preliminary hearing testimony can be shown only for impeach-
ment, and not as substantive evidence.3 It seems strange that 
the preliminary hearing testimony should be received as sub-
stantive evidence when there is no current opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness, yet it cannot be received as sub-
stantive evidence when there is a current opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. This. anomalous result suggests that 
the courts may have gone too far in restricting the applica-
tion of section 1235 against criminal defendants.4 As the 
inconsistent statement is admissible anyway where the witness 
gives testimony harmful to the prosecution,S and since the 
courts seem to believe that limiting instructions have no sub-
stantive effect,6 it is difficult to see why it should be constitu-
tionally necessary to give a limiting instruction forbidding the 
2. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20 
L.Ed .2d 255, 88 S.Ct. 1318 (1968). 
3. People v. Green, 70 A.C. 696, 75 
Cal. Rptr 782, 451 P.2d 422 (1969). 
The factual recitation by the Supreme 
Court suggests that the preliminary 
transcript could have been admitted as 
substantive evidence under Cal. Evid. 
Code § 1237 as recorded memory. The 
Court did not, however, discuss this pos-
sibility. It may be that the "confronta-
tion" objection to admissibility under 
§ 1235 is also applicable to recorded 
memory offered under § 1237. See 
footnote 6 of the court's opinion. See 
18 CAL LAW 1969 
also People v Davis, infra footnote 8, 
and the discussion relating thereto. 
4. A more rational rule would be to 
hold that § 1235 call be used against a 
criminal defendant if the witness has 
first given testimony damaging to the 
prosecution's case or if the inconsistent 
statement would be admissible under 
§ 1291 were the witness unavailable at 
the trial. 
5. See People v. Woodberry, 265 Cal. 
App.2d at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
6. See Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.C!. 1620 
(J 968). 
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use of the prior statement as substantive evidence.7 If the 
courts are right and the limiting instruction does not have 
any real effect, the only other rule which might be applied 
rationally would be to forbid the prosecution from impeaching 
the defendant's witnesses with their inconsistent pretrial state-
ments. This, it is submitted, would withhold too much evi-
dence from the trier of fact and would create too great a 
possibility of misdetermination of the facts. 
One further development in this area should be noted. In 
People v. DavisB the court had occasion to apply the recorded 
memory exception contained in section 1237. The case is 
notable because the memory was that recorded by two indi-
viduals. One witness testified that she had made a true nota-
tion of a license number and read it to the other witness over 
the phone. The other witness testified that he had made a 
true recording of his telephone conversation, and he produced 
his recorded note in court. His testimony as to the content 
of his note was held admissible as recorded memory. Under 
former law, of course, the document containing recorded 
memory had to be made by or under the supervision of the 
person witnessing the matter recorded in the document. The 
Evidence Code made possible the admission of a memory 
recorded by another. 
Here again, the opportunity for cross-examining the witness 
concerning the subject matter of his observation is totally 
absent for he has no recollection of the matter he observed. 
If confrontation is to be a bar to further developments of 
the hearsay rule in criminal cases, perhaps the extension of 
section 1237 to cooperatively recorded memory is also for-
bidden by the constitution. 
State of Mind 
The hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's 
state of mind has been peculiarly troublesome for the Cali-
fornia courts. Some of the problems are explored in the 
7. See the discussion in People v. 8. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
Pierce, 269 A.C.A. 192, 269 Cal. App. 242 (1968). 
2d -, 75 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969). 
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comments to the Evidence Code sections dealing with this 
exception to the hearsay rule. 9 In 1968, this exception was 
again before the court on a number of occasions. The prin-
cipal case was People v. Lew. 10 This case, like People v. 
Merkourisll and People v. Hamilton 12 and several subsequent 
court of appeal decisions, again concerned evidence of state-
ments made by a murder victim relating threats made by the 
defendant and other fear-engendering acts. 
In Lew, the defendant and the victim were alone inside 
his apartment. The victim was shot by a pistol owned by 
the defendant. The defendant testified that the shooting 
occurred accidentally. The prosecution introduced, over de-
fense objection, remarks made by the victim stating that the 
defendant had threatened to kill her. Some of the witnesses 
testified, in addition, that the victim had stated that the de-
fendant had threatened her parents, that the victim had stated 
she feared the defendant, that the victim had stated that the 
defendant had a terrible temper and went into rages, and 
that the victim had stated that the defendant displayed a gun 
to her and threatened to throw her rings into the ocean. 
Some of the victim's statements reflected no more than her 
attitude toward the defendant. Some of the statements, how-
ever, related threats and violent conduct on the part of the 
defendant. The evidence was offered ostensibly to show the 
victim's state of mind. It was the defendant's story that the 
victim had asked to see the gun owned by the defendant 
and, while she was handling it, the gun accidentally dis-
charged. The prosecution offered the victim's state of mind 
to show that the victim was afraid of the defendant, and it 
asked the jury to infer that, because of her fear, she would 
have been reluctant to handle a gun in the defendant's pres-
ence. 
The supreme court agreed that the victim's fear of the 
9. See comments to Cal. Evid. Code cert. den. 361 U.S. 943, 4 L.Ed.2d 364, 
§§ 1250-1252. 80 S.C!. 411, overruled on other grounds 
10. 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal. Rptr. 102, 66 C.2d 518. 
441 P.2d 942 (1968). 12. 55 Cal.2d 881. 13 Cal. Rptr. 649. 
11. 52 Ca1.2d 672,344 P.2d 1 (1959) 362 P.2d 473 (1961). 
20 CAL LAW 1969 
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defendant was relevant to show her reluctance to handle a 
gun in the defendant's presence.13 Nevertheless, the court 
held that the testimony concerning the victim's statements was 
inadmissible. The court said that testimony to prove the 
victim's state of mind is not admissible "if it refers solely 
to alleged past conduct on the part of the accused." More-
over, such testimony is admissible only if there is "at least 
circumstantial evidence that [the statements] are probably 
trustworthy and credible." The court found that the victim's 
statements related predominantly to conduct of the defendant, 
and the court included among such conduct the defendant's 
threats. Moreover, the court found that the victim had 
motives for falsifying her fear of the defendant. Therefore, 
under both criteria, her statements were inadmissible. 
The Lew decision leaves in doubt the admissibility of a 
victim's narration of threats made by the defendant. In 
Hamilton, upon which the court relied, the court said that 
statements of threats were admissible if they met the criteria 
stated above. In Lew, the court states that the narration of 
a threat is a narration of "past conduct" which is inadmissible. 
We are left in doubt, therefore, under these cases, whether 
the supreme court will admit a victim's narration of the de-
fendant's threats to harm the victim when there is no evi-
dence that the narration was not trustworthy, and when the 
victim's state of mind is truly relevant to the later conduct of 
the victim. 
Two other cases dealing with this exception to the hearsay 
rule point to possible defense use of this exception as it is 
expressed in the Evidence Code. In People v. Farr l4 the de-
fendant was on trial for killing his wife. The defendant 
sought to introduce a long memorandum written prior to the 
death in which he discussed his relationship with his wife. 
The principal mood expressed was love and compassion and, 
13. This asserted relevancy is ex-
tremely difficult to follow. If she were 
afraid that the defendant might harm 
her, it would seem more rational for 
her to want possession of the gun both 
to provide herself with self-protection 
and to deprive the defendant of a means 
of harming her. Nevertheless. we ac-
cept the court's rationale for the pur-
pose of discussion. 
14. 255 Cal. App.2d 679, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 477 (1967). 
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if sincere, it belied an intention to take her life. The trial 
court ruled the document inadmissible. The appellate court 
points out that, whereas some prior cases had held such a 
document inadmissible because "self-serving," under the pro-
visions of the Code, the document would be admissible to 
show the declarant's state of mind at the time the document 
was written and his state of mind for a reasonable time there-
after. Evidence of this state of mind would be properly 
admissible because that state of mind had a vital bearing on 
the gravity of the offense of which he was guilty. It was 
pointed out, however, that the admissibility of the document 
under section 1250 of the Code is subject to the requirement 
of section 1252. Thus, the court should exclude the docu-
ment if it was made under circumstances indicating its lack 
of trustworthiness. The appellate court pointed out, though, 
that the record of the first trial showed no evidence indicating 
the insincerity of the document. 
Another case, decided by the same court, is illustrative of 
a proper application of section 1252. In People v. Cruz15 the 
defendant sought to introduce a tape of an interview with the 
police after the crime had been committed in which he made 
several exculpatory statements. The tape was offered under 
Code section 1250 to show the then state of mind of the 
declarant from which it was sought to be shown that the de-
clarant's state of mind at or about the time of the crime was 
inconsistent with his guilt. The appellate court found that 
there were no indicia of trustworthiness surrounding the 
making of the statement. The defendant had the strongest 
possible motives for his exculpatory statement, even if false. 
The lack of indicia of trustworthiness rendered the statement 
inadmissible. 
Character Evidence; Habit or Custom 
The Evidence Code contains some new law on the admis-
sibility of evidence relating to character. Under the Code 
15. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
603 (1968). 
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character evidence in the form of either reputation or opinion 
is admissible on the issue of the credibility of a witness. A 
criminal defendant may introduce evidence of his good char-
acter in the form of opinion or reputation evidence. The 
prosecution may introduce similar evidence to show the bad 
character of the criminal defendant if the criminal defendant 
first introduces evidence of his good character. Where there 
is a victim of the alleged crime, the defendant may introduce 
character evidence consisting of reputation, opinion, or evi-
dence of specific acts to show the bad character of the victim 
and the likelihood that the victim behaved in accordance with 
that character at the time in question. 
Several of these rules came before the appellate courts 
during 1968. In People v. Rowland16 the defendant was con-
victed of an assault with a deadly weapon. The victim and the 
defendant were riding in the victim's car, and were the only 
persons in the car when the victim was shot. The defend-
ant's version of the incident was that the victim was an aggres-
sive pervert, and the gun accidentally discharged while the 
defendant was warding off a homosexual advance by the 
VIctIm. To establish this defense, the defendant offered to 
show evidence of the victim's similar aggressions towards 
third persons. The trial court excluded such evidence, but 
the appellate court held that the exclusion was error. Under 
section 1103 of the Evidence Code, evidence of such specific 
acts is admissible to show the character of the victim of a 
crime for the purpose of proving his conduct in conformity 
with that character at the time of the alleged crime. 
In People v. Ogi7 defendant was prosecuted for murder. 
The defendant offered character evidence to show his peace-
ful disposition. On. rebuttal, the prosecution presented two 
witnesses who gave their opinion that the defendant was vio-
lent. Cross-examination developed that each witness knew 
personally of but one violent incident. Nevertheless, when it 
was shown that the witnesses had known the defendant inti-
mately for many years, the court held their opinions admissible 
16. 262 Cal. App.2d 790, 69 Cal. 17. 258 Cal. App.2d 841, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 269 (19tl3). Rptr. 289 (1968). 
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and found that their knowledge of specific incidents went to 
the weight of their opinions not to the admissibility. 
An analagous problem relates to the admissibility of ex-
pert opinion evidence concerning the credibility of the prose-
cuting witness in sex cases. In People v. Russells the state 
supreme court held that the trial court in a sex case may 
order a prosecuting witness to submit to a psychiatric exami-
nation for the purpose of determining his or her credibility 
"if the circumstances indicate a necessity therefor." The 
court indicated that where the charge rests on the credibility 
of a child as against the bare denial of of the defendant, the 
trial court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of 
the defendant to permit the examining psychiatrist to give his 
opinion on the credibility of the prosecuting witnesses. In 
Russel, the conviction was reversed because of the exclusion 
of the psychiatric evidence. 
In People v. McJntyre 19 the court pointed out that a de-
fendant must move for the appointment of a psychiatrist to 
examine the prosecuting witness. If the defendant fails to 
request a psychiatric examination for the prosecutrix, he is not 
entitled to introduce psychiatric testimony impeaching the 
prosecuting witness: 
We hold that where a defendant wants to introduce 
psychiatric testimony impeaching a prosecutrix in a sex 
offense prosecution, he must request the trial court to 
exercise its discretion, to determine, inter alia, whether 
the need for psychiatric testimony about the credibility 
of the prosecutrix outweighs the danger of such testimony, 
and to order the prosecutrix to submit to psychiatric 
examination. 20 
Closely related to character evidence, and sometimes con-
fused with it, is evidence of habit or custom. The confusion 
possibly lies in the terms that are used to describe the traits 
18. 69 Cal.2d 187,70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 19. 256 Cal. App.2d 894, 64 Cal. 
443 P.2d 794 (1968). For further dis- Rptr. 530 (1967). 
cuss ion of this case, see Collings, 20. 256 Cal. App.2d at 900, 64 Cal. 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this Rptr. at 534-535. 
volume. 
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involved. The word "character" seems to connote some moral 
quality, yet for evidentiary purposes this is not what is in-
tended. What the Evidence Code refers to as "character" is 
simply the general disposition or propensity of a person to 
engage in a certain type of conduct. On the other hand, the 
Code's reference to "habit" contemplates a regular response 
to a repeated specific situation. 1 The confusion that some-
times arises is illustrated by the first opinion in People v. 
Gaines. 2 In that case the trial court rejected a defense offer 
of proof that it was the arresting officer's long standing policy 
to make any conceivable narcotics arrest in spite of highly 
tenuous grounds for probable cause in order to remove any 
suspected contraband narcotics from circulation. The appel-
late court stated that the trial court properly excluded the evi-
dence because of the collateral issues which it would have 
raised, but suggested that the evidence was relevant to show 
habit or custom in order to prove conduct on a specified occa-
sion in conformity with the habit or custom. It is doubtful that 
this type of conduct can properly be called "habit". It seems 
to fit more nearly within the description of "character"-the 
evidence related to the officer's propensity for making arrests 
on inadequate cause. As pointed out by McCormick,3 "a habit 
is a person's regular practice of meeting a particular 
kind of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as the 
habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs at a time, 
or of giving a hand-signal for a left turn, or of alighting from 
railway cars while they are moving. The doing of the habitual 
acts may become semi-automatic." As a matter of fact, one 
might add that habitual acts usually are semi-automatic, and 
many times a person will not be conscious of his performance 
of the habitual act.4 It should be apparent, therefore, that an 
1. See comment to Cal. Evid. Code 
§ 1105. See also McCormick, Evidence, 
pages 340-341. 
2. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
468 (1968). The first opinion in the 
case appears at 67 Cal. Rptr. 159. 
3. McCormick, Evidence at page 341. 
4. "Habit is a product of acquisition. 
In this respect it differs from instinct, 
with which otherwise it has much in 
common. We say we do a thing from 
habit, e. g., nod back when a person 
not recognized nods to us, when as a 
consequence of long practice and fre-
quent repetition the action has become 
in a measure organized, and thus shorn 
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officer's determination of probable cause for a narcotics arrest 
is not likely to become so habitual that it can become semi-
automatic and performed below the level of full consciousness. 
Far more likely, an officer's propensity for making arrests 
reflects just that-his propensity or "character" for arresting 
narcotics violators upon insufficient evidence. The appellate 
court may have recognized that its discussion of this aspect of 
the case was deficient, for a rehearing was granted and the 
discussion of habit evidence was omitted from the ultimate 
opinion in the case. 
Evidence of Other Crimes 
The Evidence Code continued the prior law that evidence 
of specific acts of misconduct, including evidence of the com-
mission of other crimes, is inadmissible to prove the propensity 
of a defendant to commit the crime with which he is charged. 
Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible where rele-
vant to show some other fact. 
A frequent use of evidence of other crimes committed by 
the defendant is to show a distinctive method by which the 
defendant performs such acts. By identifying the same dis-
tinctive methods in the crime charged, the prosecution then 
is able to argue that the charged crime must also have been 
committed by the defendant. In People v. Haston5 the de-
fendant was charged with robbery. The prosecution intro-
duced evidence of prior robberies committed by the defendant 
in an effort to demonstrate that he committed the robbery 
charged as well. The supreme court pointed out several 
features that were common to both the prior crimes and the 
charged crime. Nevertheless, the court held that these com-
mon features were not "of that distinctive nature necessary to 
of some of its original appanage of full 
consciousness or attention. The char-
acteristic note of habit is mechanicality 
the oft-repeated becomes 
habitual and so automatic because the 
nervous centers engaged have taken on 
special modifications, have, according to 
the customary physiological figure, be-
26 CAL LAW 1969 
come 'seamed' by special lines of dis-
charge." 2 Sully, The Human Mind, 
224 (1892) excerpts from quotations in 
Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof, 
127, 128 (3d ed., 1937). 
5. 69 Cal.2d 233, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 
444 P.2d 91 (1968). 
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raise a logical inference that the perpetrators of the prior 
offenses were the perpetrators of the charged of-
fenses." The common features were common to many armed 
robberies, and to permit such evidence to be received would be 
to authorize the conviction of the defendant merely because 
he had been proved to have been a robber on prior occasions. 
The court went further, however, and pointed out that a com-
mon feature of all of the crimes, including the crime charged, 
was the identity of the other participant in the crime. "There 
is only one [D.M.] and his conjunction with defendant in 
earlier robberies, together with his admitted participation in 
the robberies charged, supports the inference that defendant 
and not some other person was his accomplice in those charged 
offenses. "6 
It sometimes becomes appropriate to introduce evidence of 
other crimes in sex cases. For example, in People v. Mc-
Intyre,7 evidence of uncharged sex offenses was introduced 
in order to show the lack of the defendant's innocent intent 
in engaging in the conduct charged and to show his lustful 
intent in such conduct. Evidence of other not too remote 
sex crimes against the prosecuting witness has been held ad-
missible to show a lewd disposition or the intent of the defend-
ant towards the prosecuting witness. s In People v. Stanley9 
the supreme court announced a limitation on this rule per-
mitting the admission of uncharged crimes in sex cases. 
Where proof of the crime itself depends upon the uncor-
roborated testimony of the prosecuting witness, and the prior 
crimes are also sought to be proved by the uncorroborated 
testimony of the prosecuting witness, the supreme court held 
that the evidence of the prior crimes is inadmissible. Said 
the court, "the cases establish that where the basic issue of 
the case is the veracity of the prosecuting witness and the 
6. 69 Cal.2d at 249, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 
430, 444 P.2d at 102. People v. Cava-
naugh, 69 Cal.2d 262, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
438, 444 P.2d 110 (1968) is to the same 
effect. 
7. 256 Cal. App.2d 894, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
530 (1967). 
8. See the discussion in People v. 
Stanley, 67 Cal.2d 812, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
825, 433 P .2d 913 (1967). 
9. 67 Ca1.2d 812, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825, 
433 P.2d 913 (1967). 
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defendant as to the commission of the acts charged, the trier 
of fact is not aided by evidence of other offenses where that 
evidence is limited to the uncorroborated testimony of the 
prosecuting witness."lo There was the additional factor in the 
Stanley case that the prosecuting witness was substantially im-
peached-the court said that the witness' recitation of prior 
misconduct by the defendant against the witness added nothing 
to the credibility of the testimony concerning the charged 
crime. 
In People v. lackson ll the court was involved with another 
aspect of the problem. There the other crimes sought to be 
proved did not relate to the defendant's conduct but related 
to the conduct of the defendant's co-conspirator. The other 
crimes were offered to show the co-conspirator's intent in en-
gaging in the acts. Since the defendant was aiding and 
abetting the co-conspirator in performing these acts, that in-
tent would be imputed to the defendant as an aider and abettor. 
The court rejected this rationale because it considered it un-
fair for the defendant to have the burden of proving his co-
conspirator's innocence of the uncharged crimes. 
The court misstated the issue somewhat. Of course, the 
defendant does not have the burden of proving anyone's in-
nocence. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the co-
conspirator's intent, and that burden remains with the prose-
cution. What the court meant is that it is unfair to expect 
the defendant to meet the prosecution's evidence of his co-
conspirator's uncharged crimes. Nevertheless, since the 
crucial element in the case was the intent with which the co-
conspirator and the defendant were doing the acts they were 
engaged in, the rule prohibiting the admission of uncharged 
crimes seems unduly stultifying if that evidence is relevant 
to prove the co-conspirator's intent. A similar argument could 
be made against any other evidence relating to the co-con-
spira tor's acts or intent. The problem is not limited to the 
situation before the court; it is inherent whenever the criminal 
responsibility of one individual is based on the conduct of an-
10. 67 Cal.2d at 817, 63 Cal. Rptr. 11. 254 Cal. App.2d 655. 62 Cal. 
at 827-828, 433 P.2d at 915-916. Rptr. 208 (1967). 
28 CAL LAW 1969 
28
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/4
Evidence 
other. There seems to be no special reason to bar the prose-
cution from presenting evidence relevant to prove the acts or 
intent of one party to a conspiracy in only those cases where 
the evidence shows he committed an uncharged crime. 
Search and Seizure 
The major new development in the search and seizure cases 
was the holding in People v. Sesslin12 that a complaint "on 
information and belief" is insufficient to support a valid arrest 
warrant unless the facts underlying the belief are also alleged 
and the magistrate determines that such facts support the com-
plainant's belief. Hence, an arrest based on such a warrant is 
an illegal arrest, and evidence seized incident to such an arrest 
is inadmissible. A complaint alleging the commission of a 
crime on information and belief may be adequate if the com-
plaint alleges sufficient facts to show the commission of the 
crime by the person whose arrest is sought and the reliability 
of the information and credibility of its source. The com-
plaint found inadequate in Sesslin did not relate any facts 
which would support the complainant's belief that the de-
fendant had committed the crime charged and did not state 
any facts relating to the identity or credibility of the source of 
the complainant's information. Accordingly, the complaint 
was found inadequate. 
As a general rule, a police officer may not forcibly enter 
property pursuant to a search warrant unless he has an-
nounced his authority and purpose and is refused admittance.13 
However, if there are facts known to the officer before his 
entry sufficient to support his good faith belief that such an 
announcement would increase his peril or frustrate the pur-
pose of the warrant, he may force an entry without an an-
nouncement. 14 In People v. Gastelo16 the court held that it 
could not authorize forced entry without announcement in 
12. 68 Cal.2d 418, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 14. People v. Gastelo, 67 C.2d 586, 
439 P.2d 321 (1968). 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706 (1967). 
13. Cal. Penal Code § 1531. 15. 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 
432 P.2d 706 (1967). 
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all narcotics cases. 16 Particularized justification for an un-
announced, forcible entry into the property to be searched 
must be shown before the evidence obtained can be used. 
In People v. Wohlleben17 the defendant was arrested upon 
three traffic warrants. During the booking process, he was 
routinely searched, and marijuana was found. At the later 
prosecution for the possession of the marijuana, the prosecu-
tion attempted to establish the admissibility of the marijuana 
evidence by showing the legality of the arrest and subsequent 
search. To prove the legality of the arrest, the prosecution 
called one of the arresting officers to testify to the traffic war-
rants. He testified that he had seen telegraphic copies or 
abstracts of the traffic warrants at the police station. The de-
fendant objected to this testimony on the ground of the best 
evidence rule. The trial court overruled the objection, but 
the appellate court properly reversed the trial court. Evi-
dence Code sections 1500 and 1506 forbid the admission of 
any evidence of the content of a public writing (the warrants 
in this case) other than the writing itself or a copy. Testi-
mony as to the content of a copy of a public writing is not 
admissible under normal circumstances. IS 
Parol Evidence Rule 
The major development in the civil cases during 1968 is 
found in three supreme court cases dealing with the parol 
evidence rule. In Masterson v. Sine l9 the court abandoned 
the rule that had been stated in some prior cases that whether 
a written agreement was intended to be the entire agreement 
between the parties is to be determined solely from the face 
of the instrument. The court found that this strict formula-
tion of the parol evidence rule had never been consistently ap-
plied. The court pointed out that the Restatement of Con-
tracts would authorize proof of a collateral agreement if it 
16. Cf. People v. De Leon, 260 Cal. 
App.2d 143, 67 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1968). 
17. 261 Cal. App.2d 461, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 826 (1968). 
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19. 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 
436 P.2d 561 (1968). 
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"is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate 
agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written 
contract.,,20 The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code 
would exclude oral evidence only if the additional terms are 
such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been in-
cluded in the document. 
In Masterson, the court was dealing with a conveyance of a 
ranch reserving to the grantors an option to purchase the 
property back again. The question was whether the option 
was personal to the grantors or whether it could be assigned. 
The document was silent. The court held that evidence was 
admissible to show that the option was not assignable, and 
reversed the ruling of the trial court which had excluded such 
evidence. 
In Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. G.W. Thomas Dray-
age & Rigging Company! the court was dealing with an in-
demnity clause in a contract. One party offered evidence 
to show that the indemnity clause was meant to cover injury 
to property of third parties only and not to property of the 
contracting parties. Here the court stated that the test of 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of 
a written contract is not whether the contract appears to the 
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether 
the offered language is relevant to prove a meaning to which 
the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. The 
court stated that rational interpretation requires at least a pre-
liminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove 
the intention of the parties. The trial court was found to have 
erroneously refused to consider extrinsic evidence to show 
the meaning of the indemnity clause. 
The final case dealing with the parol evidence rule is 
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto.2 Here, the plaintiff and the 
defendant had entered into a contract by which the defendant 
agreed to purchase and sell 50,000 locks from the plaintiff 
20. Restatement of Contracts, § 240 2. 69 Cal.2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785, 
(I)(b). 446 P.2d 785 (1968). 
1. 69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 
442 P.2d 641 (1968). 
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during the first year of the contract, and not less than 100,000 
locks during the remaining years of the contract. The con-
tract provided that if the defendant failed to distribute the 
minimum number of locks to be distributed by it, the agree-
ment was subject to termination by the plaintiff on 30 days' 
notice. The defendant failed to purchase and sell the requisite 
number of locks. The plaintiff terminated the contract and 
sued for damages. The defendant offered evidence to show 
that termination of the contract was the plaintiff's sole remedy. 
The supreme court held that the language of the contract 
was reasonably susceptible of the meaning contended for by 
the defendant. Accordingly, the trial court committed prej-
udicial error by excluding extrinsic evidence offered to prove 
the meaning of the termination clause. The court said that 
such evidence would be admissible to show that the parties 
had in fact intended to make termination the sole remedy. 
Presumptions 
In People v. lohnson3 the court considered certain pre-
sumptions created by Penal Code section 270, which provides 
that it is a misdemeanor for a father to willfully fail, without 
lawful excuse, to provide for the support and maintenance 
of his minor children. It further provides that proof of aban-
donment or desertion of a child by the father, or the omission 
by the father to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or 
medical assistance, is "prima facie" evidence that the abandon-
ment or desertion or failure to provide necessary care is will-
ful and without lawful excuse. Under the Evidence Code, 
this provision creates a rebuttable presumption.4 The de-
fendant argued that it is unconstitutional to create such a pre-
sumption, but his argument was rejected by the court. 
Section 270 of the Penal Code also provides that if the 
father fails to provide for his children and remains out of 
the state for 30 days during such violation he is gUilty of a 
felony. Proof of the omission by the father to provide neces-
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 705, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
99 (1968). 
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sary care for more than 30 days, under the statute, is prima 
facie evidence that the father was outside the state. This pro-
vision, said the court, is unconstitutional. There is no rational 
connection between the omission of a father to provide for 
his children for 30 days and his location at the time of such 
omISSIon. Inasmuch as there is no rational connection be-
tween the proven fact giving rise to the presumption and the 
presumed fact, the presumption was held unconstitutional. 
Privileges 
In Carlton v. Superior Court5 the plaintiff in a personal in-
jury action was seeking to obtain hospital records pertaining 
to the defendant to show that the defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol. The superior court agreed with the 
plaintiff's contention that the defendant, by denying liability, 
had tendered the issue of his condition and thus waived his 
physician-patient privilege. The appellate court disagreed. 
Said the court, "it seems clear that in an action for damages 
for personal injuries the issues are 'tendered' by the plaintiff 
within the meaning of section 996 of the Evidence Code, by 
plaintiff's factual allegations as to such things as defend-
ant's conduct (intoxication, etc.), and not by defendant's 
denial of such allegations which constitutes no more than 
a joinder of issue." The defendant did not tender his con-
dition by denying liability and, therefore, did not waive the 
physician-patient privilege. Accordingly, the plaintiff was 
not entitled to discover the hospital records for they were pro-
tected by the defendant's physician-patient privilege. 
In the same case the trial court indicated that it would look 
at the hospital records to determine which of those records 
were protected by the privilege and which were not. The 
appellate court pointed out that Evidence Code section 915 
forbids the determination of the applicability of the physician-
patient privilege by this procedure. A judge may not re-
quire disclosure of information claimed to be privileged in 
order to rule on the claim of privilege unless the privilege in-
5. 261 Cal. App.2d 282, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
568 (1968). 
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volved is the official information,6 identity of informer,7 or 
trade secret privilege. B 
In Richards v. Superior Court,9 the court seems to have read 
a substantive meaning into section 1040 of the Evidence 
Code that was not intended by its authors. The case involved 
a plaintiff in a personal injury action who had previously made 
a claim for disability insurance benefits under the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Code. In connection with that claim, which 
arose out of the same occurrence involved in the personal 
injury action, the department of employment referred the 
plaintiff to a physician, who submitted a report of his findings 
to the department. 
The plaintiff thereafter signed a document authorizing the 
doctor to release the records of his examination to the de-
fendants' attorney, whereupon defendants attempted to sub-
poena the doctor and his records for a discovery deposition. 
The department of employment moved to quash the subpoena, 
and the court granted the motion, on the ground that the 
records were privileged. 
All parties conceded that the Unemployment Insurance 
Code created a privilege. The only question was whether it 
had been waived by a person authorized to do so. The de-
fendant relied on Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court10 
which had held that the person reporting to the department can 
waive the privilege created by the Unemployment Insurance 
Code. The court in Richards distinguished the Crest Catering 
decision on the grounds that it was decided before enactment 
of the Evidence Code and that the privilege was invoked 
in Crest by the person reporting, not the department. The 
opinion suggests that the enactment of the Code made the 
privilege absolute and not subject to waiver by the person 
reporting. 
It is unlikely that the Evidence Code was intended to 
have any effect on statutory privileges created by other codes. 
6. Cal. Evid. Code § 1040. 
7. Cal. Evid. Code § 1041. 
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 1060. 
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Rptr. 917 (1968). 
10. 62 Cal.2d 274, 42 Cal. Rptr. 
110, 398 P.2d 150 (1965). 
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Evidence Code section 1040, upon which Richards relies, 
merely recognizes the existence of other statutory privileges, 
it does not purport to modify them. If a statute creating a 
privilege permitted waiver of the privilege prior to the Evi-
dence Code, there is no reason to believe the statute would 
not permit a similiar waiver after enactment of the Code. 
Section 1040 states merely that "official information" is privi-
leged if "disclosure is forbidden by . . . a statute of this 
state." If such a statute permits waiver under certain cir-
cumstances, therefore, disclosure under those circumstances 
is not forbidden by the statute. If Crest Catering held that 
the statute permits waiver by the person reporting, it would 
follow that the statute would still permit such waiver after 
enactment of the Evidence Code. As pointed out in 
Richards, however, Crest Catering did not involve a claim of 
privilege by the department itself. Therefore, it held only 
that the person reporting could effectively waive his own 
privilege under the statute. Richards involved a claim of 
privilege by the department, and it holds that the depart-
ment's right to claim the privilege cannot be waived by the 
person reporting. The holding must be based, however, on 
the Unemployment Insurance Code, not upon some additional 
force given to that code by the Evidence Code. 
Judicial Notice 
In People v. M(lcLaird,ll the court, relying on section 451 
of the Evidence Code, held that the principles underlying 
radar are so universally known that a court must take judicial 
notice of the accuracy of radar as a speed measuring device. 
Of course, the installation, accuracy, and operation of a par-
ticular radar machine cannot be judicially noticed; those 
facts must be established by competent evidence. 
Conclusion 
The courts for the most part have continued to accept and 
apply the Evidence Code with enthusiasm and understanding. 
11. 264 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 
191 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1969 35 
35
Harvey: Evidence
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Evidence 
In a few instances, they have shown a tendency to apply 
broadened rules of admissibility only against the prosecution 
in criminal cases, finding constitutional objections to broad-
ened rules of admissibility against defendants. It remains 
to be seen whether these are isolated instances involving 
specific problems or whether the cases indicate a trend. 
It is clear, however, that the initiative for change in the 
law of evidence has once more been assumed by the courts. 
In exercising this initiative, it is to be hoped that they will 
not consider specific problems in isolation from the whole 
law of evidence for such an approach can only lead to the 
creation of the anomalies and anachronisms that prompted the 
enactment of the Code. 
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